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Summary 
Semantic dementia is characterized by semantic deficits and behavioural abnormalities which 
occur in the wake of bilateral inferolateral and predominantly left-sided anterior temporal lobe 
atrophy. The temporal poles have been shown to be involved in theory of mind, namely the 
ability to ascribe cognitive and affective mental states to others that regulates social interactions 
by predicting and interpreting human behaviour. However, very few studies have examined 
theory of mind in semantic dementia. In this study, we investigated both cognitive and affective 
theory of mind in a group of semantic dementia patients, using separate objective and subjective 
assessment tasks. Results provided objective evidence of an impact of semantic dementia on 
cognitive and affective theory of mind, consistent with the patients‟ atrophy in the left temporal 
lobe and hypometabolism in the temporal lobes and the medial frontal cortex. However, the 
subjective assessment of theory of mind suggested that awareness of the affective but not 
cognitive theory of mind deficit persists into the moderate stage of the disease.  
 
 
Key words: semantic dementia; cognitive/affective theory of mind; objective/subjective 
assessment; imaging. 
 
Abbreviations: SD = semantic dementia; ToM = theory of mind; bv-FTD = behavioural variant 
of frontotemporal dementia 
Total word count in the text: 7, 621 
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1. Introduction 
Semantic dementia (SD) is the term that was proposed by Snowden et al., (1989) to 
designate patients suffering from a progressive neurodegenerative disorder characterized by a 
“loss of semantic information”. From a cognitive point of view, patients start to display 
multimodal semantic memory deterioration, manifested in specific language disturbances, in the 
early stages of SD. Spontaneous speech is fluent but empty, with preserved phonological and 
grammatical aspects as well as repetition, while naming and comprehension gradually become 
impaired. These symptoms are generally accompanied by semantic paraphasias, agnosia for 
objects and prosopagnosia, but visuospatial skills and day-to-day memory are relatively 
preserved (Hodges and Patterson, 2007). From a nosological perspective, SD, also known as the 
temporal variant of frontotemporal dementia, is one of the three clinical forms of frontotemporal 
lobar degeneration, along with the frontal or behavioural variant one (bv-FTD) and progressive 
non-fluent aphasia (Neary et al., 1998). Frontotemporal lobar degeneration is a 
neurodegenerative process affecting the frontal and/or temporal lobes. Its clinical picture includes 
aberrations in language and cognition, but also in behaviour and social function (for a review, see 
Wittenberg et al., 2008). For instance, loss of empathy and impaired emotion recognition are 
some of the main symptoms (Snowden et al., 2001; Lough et al., 2006). 
Personality modifications and social dysfunctions in frontotemporal lobar degeneration 
are assumed to be related to theory of mind (ToM) impairments (Kipps et al., 2006). ToM is the 
ability to infer people‟s mental states (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Frith and Frith, 1999). It 
allows individuals both to ascribe cognitive and affective states to others and to deduce their 
intentions from their attitudes (Brothers and Ring, 1992; Corricelli, 2005). Insofar as ToM 
enables individuals to predict, anticipate and interpret human behaviour, it is essential for 
regulating social interactions (Beer and Ochsner, 2006). A distinction can be made between 
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“cognitive ToM”, which concerns the cognitive states, beliefs, thoughts, or intentions of other 
people (Brothers and Ring, 1992; Coricelli, 2005), and “affective ToM”, which concerns the 
affective states, emotions or feelings of others (Brothers and Ring, 1992). Furthermore, Baron-
Cohen and colleagues (1997; Adolphs et al., 2002) have found that basic and complex emotions 
are differently addressed: while basic emotions are automatically and cross-culturally recognized, 
and probably rely on an innate mechanism (Izard, 1994), complex emotions express blends of 
mental states or social emotions which generally arise within an interpersonal context. Although 
some researchers hold that affective ToM is similar to empathy (Decety and Lamm, 2006), these 
two concepts are actually somewhat different. Although both conduct to the genuine 
understanding of mental affective states, we consider that the term “empathy” refers to the feeling 
and experiencing of another person‟s emotion, whereas affective ToM refers to the ability to 
adopt the other person‟s point of view, or “put oneself in his/her shoes”, without necessarily 
experiencing any emotion (Pacherie, 2004). That said, some theoretical conceptions of empathy 
distinguish between the “emotional empathy” described above and “cognitive empathy”, which is 
synonymous with affective ToM (Davis, 1980; Eslinger, 1998; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2004). In 
addition to the cognitive/affective ToM distinction, we can distinguish between first- and second-
order mental representations. “First-order” refers to representations of an individual‟s thoughts 
that are achieved by adopting the latter‟s perspective (e.g. „I think that Mr X thinks that…‟). 
“Second-order” representations, which can be likened to “metarepresentations” (Morin, 2006; 
2010), involve simultaneously adopting two perspectives (e.g. „Mr X thinks that Miss Y thinks 
that…‟). 
Numerous neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural correlates of ToM via 
different ToM tasks, such as inferring characters‟ cognitive mental states through verbal or visual 
stories (Brunet et al., 2000; Walter et al., 2004), inferring affective states from photographs of 
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emotional faces or the eye region (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; 2001), observing the movements 
and interactions of geometrical shapes (Schultz et al., 2003; Gobbini et al., 2007), and other 
subject-agent interaction procedures (Gallagher et al., 2002; Schilbach et al., 2006). These 
studies have highlighted a ToM-related cerebral network (for reviews, see Abu-Akel, 2003; Frith 
and Frith, 2003; Carrington and Bailey, 2009) which is broadly constituted by the prefrontal 
cortex, including the orbital and medial prefrontal cortices (Baron-Cohen and Goodhart, 1994; 
Fletcher et al., 1995; Goel et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Happaney et al., 2004; Adenzato et 
al., 2010), the temporal lobes, including the superior temporal sulci and the temporal poles 
(Olson et al., 2007), and the amygdala (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). While less attention has been 
paid to the temporal poles than the prefrontal cortex in ToM, Ross and Olson (2010) recently 
drew attention to the contribution of the anterior temporal lobes in social attribution and ToM 
tasks. Their findings, in healthy adults, underline the fact that ToM abilities rely on the anterior 
temporal lobes to activate a set of social semantic representations. In other words, a body of 
social semantic knowledge stored in the anterior temporal lobes is required in order to understand 
other people‟s mental states. 
The profound semantic deterioration seen in SD patients is generally the result of bilateral 
atrophy of the temporal lobes. Neuroimaging studies in SD patients have indicated an 
anteroposterior gradient, with greater atrophy anteriorly. Moreover, this atrophy tends to be 
predominantly left-sided, rather than right-sided or symmetrical (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2004; 
Desgranges et al., 2007; Wittenberg, 2008). Otherwise, authors have reported significant 
hypometabolism in the whole left temporal cortex and in the right temporal pole. More extensive 
than the atrophy, this hypometabolism also encompasses the frontal areas (Edward-Lee et al., 
1997) especially the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex (Desgranges et al., 2007). 
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In the light of the cognitive and cerebral impairments in SD, it is legitimate to ask whether 
ToM is normal in SD patients. Surprisingly little is known about this issue, while ToM has been 
widely studied in bv-FTD (for a review, see Adenzato et al., 2010). Some authors have, however, 
assessed empathy in SD via different scales, such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 
1983). They have generally found that SD patients have impairments in both the cognitive and 
emotional components of empathy. This decline has been related to right-sided temporal atrophy 
(Perry et al., 2001; Rankin et al., 2005). However, in a recent case report, Calabria et al. (2009) 
showed that the cognitive component of empathy is more impaired than the emotional one in the 
presence of left-sided temporal atrophy. Their finding suggests that the cognitive aspects of 
empathy (and, by extension, of affective ToM) are sustained by the left temporal lobe. As far as 
ToM per se is concerned, Eslinger and colleagues (2007) studied cognitive ToM in a group of 14 
patients, some of whom had SD. Using cognitive ToM tasks that elicited either intention-based 
predictions or first- and second-order beliefs of characters in a social context they demonstrated 
impairment in both tasks. This impairment was less severe than that found in a group of patients 
suffering from bv-FTD. However, one major limitation to this study was that patients with SD 
were mixed with patients with non-fluent progressive aphasia, without giving any indication as to 
either the number and characteristics of the SD patients, or their specific performances. Adopting 
a different approach, Rankin et al. (2009) studied sarcasm and whether it could be detected from 
paralinguistic cues in several groups of patients with neurodegenerative diseases, including a 
group of 11 SD patients. Like irony, sarcasm is a high-level communicative intention requiring 
cognitive ToM (Sabbagh et al., 2004). The authors found that independently of their language 
deficit, SD patients failed to detect sarcasm in nonverbal features, whereas they outperformed 
controls in the innuendo-free condition. These findings suggest that the cognitive aspects of ToM 
tend to deteriorate in SD, although the study used only one cognitive ToM task and did not 
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explore affective ToM. That said, in a previous exploratory investigation of a single SD case, we 
found deficits in cognitive ToM in the absence of deficits in affective ToM (Bon et al., 2009).  
The aim of the present study was to examine ToM abilities in SD by investigating for the 
very first time both the cognitive and affective dimensions of ToM in the same group of SD 
patients. Using the thorough ToM assessment validated by Duval et al. (2011), we carried out not 
just an objective ToM assessment but a subjective one, too. The objective assessment comprised 
specially adapted standard tests evaluating either cognitive or affective ToM, plus an original 
composite test covering both these aspects, that was designed to explore ToM under conditions 
matching the social context of everyday life. In the subjective assessment, a self-rating ToM scale 
was used to probe ToM deficit awareness. 
In the light of the cognitive and cerebral deterioration in SD and the scant data available 
in the literature, we expected to find impairment of SD patients‟ cognitive ToM involving the 
inference of intentions and high-level beliefs, as well as of affective ToM involving the inference 
of emotions.  
2. Material and methods 
2.1. SD patients.  
We studied fifteen patients (6 men, 9 women) in the early to moderate stages of SD (mean 
age = 64.27 ± 6.53 years, range: 51 -78 years; mean disease duration = 3.93 ± 1.98 years), who 
were selected on the basis of research criteria for SD established by Neary et al. (1998). 
Demographic data are detailed in Table 1. The selection of patients was carried out according to a 
codified procedure in French expert centres (University hospitals of Caen and Rennes) by senior 
neurologists whose main activity consists of the diagnosis and follow-up of patients suffering 
from neurodegenerative disorders, as well as by neuropsychologists and speech therapists. 
Patients with a history of alcoholism, head trauma, neurological or psychiatric illness were 
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excluded. In all patients, according to their families, the predominant and inaugural symptom had 
been a semantic memory deficit, reflected by anomia and word comprehension difficulties, as 
well as by deficits in the recognition of familiar people. With the exception of one patient who 
had additional day-to-day memory impairment, in each case, the family reported preserved 
everyday memory and autonomy. These patients could therefore continue to carry out everyday 
activities such as doing their own shopping, using public transport, keeping general practitioner‟s 
appointments and remembering recent or current events. They were also well oriented in time and 
space. For each patient, cognitive complaints and levels of depression were measured via the 
short Cognitive Difficulties Scale (McNair and Kahn, 1983) and the short Geriatric Depression 
Scale (Yesavage et al., 1983), respectively. There was no significant difference with healthy 
subjects. Their overall cognitive efficiency was assessed using the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale 
(Mattis, 1976). All patients displayed overall cognitive decline (Table 1). 
Furthermore, 10 patients underwent a high-resolution T1-weighted volume Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging scan (3T scanner) and 9 of them a resting Positron Emission Tomography 
investigation using [
18
F]fluoro-2-deoxy-D-glucose at the CYCERON centre (Caen, France). For 
both types of imaging data, we assessed group differences in SPM5 using a threshold of p = 0.01 
family-wise error-corrected, to obtain maps of significant atrophy and hypometabolism in 
patients with SD compared with an independent sample of 26 control adults, paired in age and 
years of education, from our imaging database. The remaining patients underwent a standard 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan which confirmed the diagnosis. This mainly revealed atrophy 
of the temporal neocortex, predominantly in the left hemisphere in all cases but one.  
For the 10 abovementioned patients, our SPM analysis showed that regions of significant 
grey matter loss involved the whole temporal neocortex (temporal pole and inferior, middle and 
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superior temporal gyri), extending to the hippocampal region (hippocampus, parahippocampal 
gyrus, amygdala), as well as the fusiform gyrus, insula and caudate nucleus (see Figure 1A). 
Although present bilaterally, the atrophy predominated in the left hemisphere, especially for 
posterior and superior temporal regions. Regions of significant hypometabolism overlapped 
roughly the significant grey matter loss (see Figure 1B). On the left side, it encompassed the 
entire temporal lobe, including both the whole temporal neocortex and the hippocampal region, 
and also encroached on the fusiform gyrus, insula, caudate and pallidum nucleus. On the right 
side, the hypometabolism was less significant and mainly concerned the temporal pole and 
medial temporal region (including the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus). Frontal regions, 
especially the bilateral medial orbitofrontal cortex and rectus gyrus, as well as the left anterior 
cingulate cortex, were also involved, albeit to a lesser extent. 
This protocol was approved by the Regional Ethics Committee. Controls and patients 
gave written consent to the procedure prior to the investigation. 
2.2. General neuropsychological assessment.  
In order to gain a clear picture of their neuropsychological disturbance, the SD patients 
underwent a general neuropsychological assessment beforehand (mean: 5.3 ± 2.76 months prior 
to inclusion in the study), comprising semantic, episodic and working memory tests. 
Neuropsychological test performances for the group of SD patients are summarised in Table 2. 
We explored semantic memory by means of 1) the Concept subscale of the Mattis scale (Mattis, 
1976), 2) literal and categorical verbal fluency tasks in 2 minutes each (Cardebat et al., 1990) 
and, 3) picture naming tasks (DO80, Deloche and Hannequin, 1997, or BECS-GRECO naming, 
Belliard et al., 2008). We assessed verbal episodic memory using the Logical Memory subtest 
of the Wechsler Memory Scale (Wechsler, 2001), while visuospatial episodic memory was 
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probed with the “Test de la Ruche” (Violon and Wijns, 1984) and/or the delayed recall of the 
Rey-Osterrieth complex figure (from Lezak, 1995). Working memory was evaluated by means 
of a digit span test (Wechsler, 2001). To assess executive functions, as defined by Miyake et al. 
(2000), we investigated the shifting process, updating function and inhibition of inappropriate 
responses using the Trail-Making Test (Reitan, 1958), the running span task (Quinette et al., 
2003) and the Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935), respectively, while problem-solving was evaluated by 
means of Raven's coloured progressives matrices (Raven, 1965). Finally, visuoconstructive  
abilities were probed with the copy of the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure (Lezak, 1995). 
In brief, the results, reported in Table 2, clearly indicated that the SD patients displayed 
massive semantic memory difficulties, with anomia and impoverished general semantic 
knowledge of concepts. While visual episodic memory was relatively preserved, verbal episodic 
memory was impaired, although this may have been accentuated by interference with semantic 
and language disorders. However, these deficits were probably not enough to explain the poor 
memory performances, suggesting genuine deficits of episodic memory, in accordance with 
abnormalities in the hippocampal region, and previous findings both by our group (Desgranges et 
al., 2007) and by others (Chan et al., 2001; Good et al., 2002; Nestor et al., 2006). Similarly, 
executive functions appeared preserved in most of the patients, and no deficits were found in 
visuoconstructive abilities. 
2.4. ToM assessment. 
In order to perform consistent and exhaustive measures of ToM within the group of SD 
patients, we administered a series of assessment tasks taken from Duval et al. (2011) that were 
designed to probe both the cognitive and affective dimensions of ToM. More specifically, we 
conducted an objective assessment of ToM by means of classic visual and verbal tasks, adapting 
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them in order to reduce cognitive load. Cognitive ToM was assessed by an attribution of intention 
test (Brunet et al., 2000) and a false-belief task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983), and affective ToM 
via a version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). We also 
added a composite task called “Tom‟s taste”, which we developed to give a better account of this 
ability. Furthermore, an original self-rating questionnaire was used to assess awareness of the 
putative ToM deficit. We checked that participants fully understood each ToM task and, where 
necessary, provided an aid, mainly in the form of a glossary or the rewording of sentences. If 
their understanding remained impaired, the test was not performed. 
SD patients‟ performances were compared with those obtained in 36 healthy age-matched 
controls recruited from a local panel of volunteers (Duval et al., 2011). Each one gave his/her 
informed consent to the experimental procedure. Their inclusion was based on the absence of 
neurological or psychiatric medical history reported on a health questionnaire, signs of depression 
as measured on the short Geriatric Depression Scale, and memory complaints, as measured on the 
short Cognitive Difficulties Scale. Moreover, adults over 65 years old were screened for dementia 
using the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale. We also checked executive functioning with the Trail 
Making Test (mental flexibility) and the Stroop test (inhibition). All participants‟ scores were 
within the norm (data not shown). 
 2.4.1. Objective ToM assessment. 
Attribution of intention task. This visual task was derived from Brunet et al. (2000). It 
consisted of a set of 30 short comic strips, selected from 88 comics. Each of them comprised 
three pictures illustrating a scenario. The aim was to find the most logical conclusion for each 
scenario by choosing a fourth picture among three others. The comic strips were divided into 
three conditions. In the first one, 10 stories required participants to draw inferences from a 
character‟s actions (ToM condition). In the second one, 10 stories showed a character without 
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any intention (control condition with characters), while in the third one, 10 scenarios were based 
on the physical properties of objects (control condition with object). The latter two formed a 
control condition. Scores were percentages of correct responses in each condition. 
False-belief task. This original visual-and-verbal task was based on false-belief cartoon 
tasks such as “Sally and Ann” (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). It was made up of 15 short comic 
strips illustrating scenarios that had been dreamed up within our laboratory (Bon et al., 2009). 
Each comic strip comprised three pictures with a short written description (for an example, see 
Figure 2). The aim was to understand the story by reading the scenario, then answer a question 
with two possible responses. There were two conditions. In the ToM condition, the question was 
about the belief of one of the characters in the story. Eight of the 15 cartoons involved first-order 
representations („X thinks that…‟) and seven second-order ones („X thinks that Y thinks that…‟). 
In the control condition, the same cartoons were used, but the question probed participants‟ 
understanding of the reality of the cartoon scenario. In order to reduce cognitive load, the pictures 
and written descriptions remained visible throughout. We inserted an interference task (classic 
digit span task) between the first-and second-order cartoons and between the ToM and control 
conditions. Each performance was expressed as a percentage for each condition. 
The Eyes test. This task was inspired by the test devised by Baron-Cohen et al. (1997). It 
consisted of 20 black-and-white photographs of the eye region of a female actor who was asked 
to produce different facial expressions. Ten of the photographs depicted “basic emotions” (i.e 
happiness, surprise, sadness, anger, and fear) and ten “complex emotions” (e.i. guilt, thoughtful, 
flirting, scheming, puzzled, interested (twice), quizzical, arrogant and bored). Under each picture, 
three adjectives (one target and two foils) described basic or complex emotions. Participants were 
asked to identify which adjective best described the person‟s mental state. This test allowed us to 
measure emotion recognition in the basic emotions condition and affective ToM in the complex 
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emotions one. We took the view that affective ToM abilities are closely related to the recognition 
of complex mental emotions. Basic emotions are automatically processed, can occur outside a 
social context and consequently depend on a simple emotion recognition process. By contrast, 
complex emotions generally involve an actual or imagined social object which could be another 
individual or a socially constructed self and hence need to be inferred (Hareli and Parkinson, 
2008). They therefore require thinking and reasoning processes. Accordingly, we calculated the 
percentage of correct responses for basic emotions (control condition) and the percentage of 
correct responses for complex emotions (ToM condition); the correct responses came from a 
previous study in healthy subjects (Duval et al., 2011). A glossary had been made available to the 
SD patients so that they would attend to the adjectives‟ meaning. 
Tom’s taste. This original task, taken from Duval et al. (2011) and distantly inspired by 
Snowden et al. (2003), assessed the ability to judge the preference of another person in a given 
context, based on the content of his or her thoughts. The material consisted of 16 cartoon 
drawings on separate sheets, each showing the centrally positioned face of a character called 
Tom. This face either smiled or pouted, in order to express Tom‟s preference (i.e. affective ToM 
aspect). Tom‟s gaze was directed towards a balloon containing the picture of an object (e.g. 
biscuits) to illustrate the content of Tom‟s thoughts (i.e. cognitive ToM aspect) meaning, for 
example, that he likes biscuits. In the ToM condition, when the cartoon was shown to the 
participant, the experimenter orally described a short scenario to put it in context (e.g. “Imagine 
that you‟ve kindly invited Tom to your house for tea or coffee. What would you serve with the 
tea or coffee?”). The experimenter then showed four possible response pictures, chosen for their 
degree of relevance: madeleines (CR: correct response, taking both Tom‟s preference and the 
context into account); chocolates (C-P: response taking the context into account but not Tom‟s 
preference); salted crackers (P-C: response taking Tom‟s preference into account but not the 
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context); and oysters (UR: unsuitable response taking neither Tom‟s preference nor the context 
into account). Afterwards, participants were asked to justify their choice for each item. 
Justifications were classified into four types: 1) P: justified according to Tom‟s preference, 2) C: 
justified according to the context, 3) Self: justified according to participant‟s own preference in 
the context, and 4) Other: any other justifications. A total score was calculated for each type. 
Finally, in a last condition, we presented just the character‟s face and thought (i.e. without the 
four response pictures), and asked the participant what he/she could deduce about the character‟s 
tastes (e.g. “Tom likes biscuits”). In this “control-like condition”, we checked whether the test 
had been properly understood. In other words, we made sure that the patients‟ basic inferences 
(i.e. symbolic significance of the expressive face and the thought balloon) were accurate. Patients 
were excluded from the analysis if they failed on more than 50% of the items, a clear sign of their 
incomprehension. A total success score (%) was calculated for each condition. 
2.4.2. Subjective ToM assessment. 
ToM scale. This instrument consisted of 10 positive or negative sentences divided into 
two five-item subscales, with items drawn from several questionnaires, including Davis‟ (1983) 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index, and subscales of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck 
and Eysenck, 1985). It described various types of relationship one might have with others, 
eliciting either cognitive (thoughts, attitudes, behaviour) or affective (emotions, feelings) 
perspective-taking. Thus, the cognitive ToM subscale assessed the ability to understand, infer or 
interpret the cognitive mental states of others (e.g. „I can easily deduce someone's intentions‟), 
while the affective ToM subscale measured the ability to infer or understand the feelings of 
others, or to act in response to emotions observed in other people (e.g. „I can easily identify the 
emotions that a person is experiencing‟). Participants rated each item on a 4-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 („Does not describe me at all„) to 4 („Describes me completely‟). A total 
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score (subjective ToM measure) and two subscores (cognitive/affective ToM) were calculated 
and expressed as percentages, with higher scores associated with greater ToM abilities. To 
facilitate the use of this scale with the SD patients, its mode of administration was modified: each 
item was read aloud by the examiner and the patient simply had to point to his/her response on a 
4-point scale printed on a separate sheet. Task instructions were repeated and two rewordings of 
each item were provided, if necessary. However, if a patient nonetheless misunderstood one or 
two items, his/her score was calculated from the number of remaining items; if he/she 
misunderstood three items or more, he/she was excluded from the analysis of this task.  
 
3. Results 
 
Given the sample size of the patient group, nonparametric analyses were used to measure 
internal consistency. The Mann-Whitney U-test was conducted to gauge intergroup differences 
and Wilcoxon pairwise comparisons to assess the effect of the experimental condition compared 
with the control one. For the purposes of these analyses, a unilateral statistical level of 
significance was set at .05. Statistical analyses were conducted with all the patients. However, 
when a patient totally failed to perform the task due to a profound comprehension deficit, he/she 
was excluded from the analysis for that particular task. These instances are indicated in Table 3, 
which shows the performances of the SD patients and healthy controls on all the ToM tasks in 
each condition (ToM vs. control). Finally, in order to better understand SD patients‟ ToM 
performance, we also performed Spearman correlations between their neuropsychological scores 
and the ToM scores. 
3.1. Objective ToM assessment. 
3.1.1. Attribution of intention task. 
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Intergroup comparisons. In the experimental ToM condition, Mann-Whitney comparisons 
revealed a significant effect of group (U = 92, z = 3.63, p < .001), indicating that the SD group 
performed more poorly than the controls. However, SD patients did not significantly differ from 
the healthy controls on the two control conditions.  
Intragroup comparisons. In the patient group, Wilcoxon pairwise comparisons revealed a 
significant difference between the ToM and both control conditions: performances in the control 
conditions with characters/objects were better than performances in the ToM condition (z = 
2.86/3.06, p < .005 for both). No difference was found between the two control conditions. In the 
control group, analyses revealed a significant difference between the ToM condition and the 
control condition with objects, with a better performance in the control condition (z = 2.02, p < 
.05). 
3.1.2. False-belief task. 
Intergroup comparisons. In the experimental ToM condition, Mann-Whitney comparisons 
revealed a significant effect of group in the first-order condition (U = 124, z = 3.16, p < .005) as 
well as in the second-order one (U = 120.5, z = 3.16, p < .005), with SD patients performing more 
poorly than controls. No significant intergroup difference was found in the control condition. 
Intragroup comparisons. Analyses showed a significant effect of the ToM condition in 
both the SD (z = 3.30, p = .001) and healthy control (z = 3.75, p < .001) groups: performances in 
the total (first- and second-order) ToM condition were poorer than in the control one (Table 3). 
Moreover, a significant difference was found according to the level of representations, with 
poorer performances on second-order false beliefs than on first-order ones for both SD patients (z 
= 2.67, p = .01) and healthy controls (z = 2.91, p < .005).  
3.1.3. The Eyes test. 
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Intergroup comparisons. A significant effect of group was found in both the basic 
emotions (U = 103.5, z = 3.52, p < .001) and the complex emotions conditions (U = 175, z = 1.99, 
p = .05), in that SD patients performed more poorly than the healthy controls.  
Intragroup comparisons. Analyses showed a significant effect of condition in both the SD 
(z = 2.17, p = .05) and healthy control (z = 3.65, p < .001) groups, in that they performed better in 
the basic emotions condition than in the complex emotions one.  
3.1.4. Tom’s taste. 
Intergroup comparisons. An effect of group was found in both the ToM (U = 39, z = 3.81, 
p < .001) and the control-like (U = 54,5, z = 4.26, p < .001) conditions, in that SD patients 
performed more poorly than the healthy controls (Table 3). 
Intragroup comparisons. Analyses showed a significant effect of condition for both the 
healthy controls (T = 17, z = 3.42, p < .001) and SD patients (T = 1.5, z = 2.65, p < .01), in that 
they performed better in the control condition than in the ToM one.  
Analysis of choices of responses. In order to understand the SD patients‟ deficit in this 
complex ToM task, Mann-Whitney comparisons were conducted for each category of responses. 
Results (Figure 3A) showed that SD patients gave more C-P responses (i.e. taking the context but 
not Tom‟s preference into account; U = 49, z = -3.62, p < .001) and unsuitable responses (U = 
105, z =-2.53, p < .05) than the controls when they provided incorrect responses. 
Analysis of types of justifications. Mann-Whitney comparisons were conducted on each 
type of justification. Results (Figure 3B) indicated that SD patients justified their responses 
significantly less on the basis of Tom‟s preference (U = 46.5, z = 3.64, p < .001) and more on 
their self-views (U = 119, z = -2.19, p = .05) than the control group. 
3.2. Subjective ToM assessment. 
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Intergroup comparisons. Mann-Whitney comparisons revealed an effect of group on the 
affective ToM subscale (U = 72.5, z = 3.45, p < .001): SD patients estimated their affective ToM 
abilities more negatively than the healthy controls. No difference was found in the cognitive ToM 
subscale (U = 147, z = 1.65, ns).  
Intragroup comparisons. Analyses showed a significant difference between the two 
subscales for the healthy control group (T = 122, z = 2.47, p = .01), in that they judged their 
affective ToM abilities more favourably than their cognitive ones. Even though SD patients 
scored less well on the cognitive ToM subscale, the difference was not significant. 
To go one step further, we conducted a supplementary analysis by computing two new 
scores illustrating ToM insight in SD patients. First, we calculated two objective ToM z-scores: 
1) a cognitive ToM z-score combining performances on the attribution of intention (ToM 
condition) and false-belief tasks (Total score in the ToM condition); 2) an affective ToM z-score 
for the complex emotions condition of the Eyes test. Second, we calculated subjective cognitive 
and affective ToM z-scores for the cognitive and affective ToM subscales, respectively. Finally, 
we calculated the difference between the objective and subjective scores using the following 
formula: 1) Objective cognitive z-score minus subjective cognitive z-score for the cognitive ToM 
insight measure; 2) Objective affective z-score minus subjective affective z-score for the affective 
ToM insight measure. Each score was then compared with the normal standard (i.e. 0) (Table 4). 
The closer to zero the score was, the greater the cognitive (or affective) ToM insight. Results 
showed that SD patients significantly differed from the reference value only for cognitive ToM 
insight, indicating that they were unaware of their cognitive ToM disabilities, but not their 
affective ones. Thus, this analysis confirmed the dissociation observed in the ToM scale. 
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Overall, SD patients performed poorly on several objective tasks probing cognitive and 
affective ToM. They also gave lower ratings than the healthy controls on the sole subjective 
affective ToM scale.  
In order to obtain more stringent results, we used the Benjamini-Hochberg (1995) 
procedure for controlling the false discovery rate. Results were similar, except for the complex 
emotions condition of the Eyes test and the „Self‟ and „Other‟ justification conditions of Tom‟s 
taste, which became nonsignificant (Table 3). 
3.3. Relationhips between ToM and neuropsychological impairments 
Regarding the objective ToM assessment, Spearman correlations between the 
experimental conditions of the ToM tasks and the SD patients‟ neuropsychological scores 
revealed significant positive correlations between the Concept subscale of the Mattis scale and 
the second-order condition of the false-belief task (r = 0.52, p < .05), and between the Rey-
Osterrieth complex figure recall score and the ToM attribution of intention condition (r = 0.73, p 
< .01). Regarding the subjective ToM assessment, a significant positive correlation was found 
between the cognitive ToM subscale and literal fluency (r = .69, p < .05). After false discovery 
rate control, the correlations between ToM and neuropsychological tasks became nonsignificant. 
4. Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to explore cognitive and affective ToM, which are 
suspected of being impaired in SD. By administering a thorough ToM examination, we were able 
to demonstrate a deficit in all the ToM components assessed via objective ToM tasks, and a loss 
of insight of their cognitive ToM impairment. 
As regards cognitive ToM, SD patients failed to infer either the intentions or the false 
beliefs of a character involved in a social scenario. This deficit could not be explained by a visual 
semantic disorder or a comprehension deficit, as they achieved normal scores in the two control 
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conditions. In the test of attribution of intention, for instance, SD patients were particularly poor 
at predicting a character‟s action, though not the future of characters without intention or of 
physical objects. This result could be explained by the major temporal lobe abnormalities which 
characterize those patients, especially in the left temporal pole. Using a similar ToM task in a 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study with healthy participants, Völlm et al. (2006) found 
that the temporal poles, with a left-sided preponderance, were activated in the ToM condition but 
not in the two control conditions (i.e. physical causality relative to a character without intention 
or a simple object). Likewise, Walter et al. (2004) reported similar results with an equivalent task 
of deducing other people‟s intentions.  
We also showed a link between visual episodic memory and the ToM condition of this 
task. The relationship between episodic memory and mentalizing has already been flagged up in 
developmental studies (Perner, 2000), and neuroimaging studies have shown that the two 
processes are mediated by similar brain networks, including the hippocampus (Perry et al., 2011; 
Rabin et al., 2010; Spreng and Grady, 2010). According to Perry and colleagues (2011), 
mentalizing may be based on self-projection, where the individual recalls experiencing a similar 
event. Thus, SD patients may have attempted to rely on their memories of social experiences in 
order to comprehend the protagonists‟ intentions‟. While not compensating for their ToM deficit, 
episodic memory abilities did account for a proportion of the variability in their ToM 
performances in the attribution of intention test. 
As far as the false-belief task is concerned, we showed that SD patients had difficulties 
inferring the characters‟ beliefs, especially when they had to take two perspectives 
simultaneously into account. According to Samson et al. (2005), two components of ToM are 
typically involved in classic false-belief tasks: inhibition of one‟s own perspective and inference 
of another person‟s mental state. In our task, participants could only choose between two 
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responses: one referring to the character‟s mental state, the other to the reality of the scenario. It 
is, therefore, entirely possible that the patients‟ erroneous responses reflected a deficit in the 
inhibition of their own perspective, given that they obviously understood the scenario properly. 
However, it is more likely that SD patients presented a specific disturbance in the inference of 
mental states. For a start, their performance declined according to the degree of inference, such 
that second-order ToM was more impaired than first-order ToM. Second, no relationship was 
found between the false-belief task and the SD patients‟ inhibition performance. The significant 
correlation between the Concept subscale of the Mattis scale and second-order false belief ToM 
suggests that the patients‟ semantic impairment may have interfered with and/or impoverished 
their complex reasoning. 
Most studies using false-belief tasks in healthy adults have underlined the involvement of 
the temporal regions, as well as the median prefrontal cortex and, more especially, the anterior 
cingulate cortex (Gallagher et al., 2000; Vogeley et al., 2001; Ferstl and Von Cramon, 2002). 
Moreover, bv-FTD patients with bilateral atrophy in the orbitomedial region and anterior 
temporal lobe have been shown to perform poorly on first- and second-order tests (Lough et al., 
2001; Adenzato et al., 2010). The SD patients in the current study presented broad left-sided 
temporal atrophy, together with hypometabolism in similar areas, but also in the median 
orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate regions, which may explain their cognitive ToM decline. 
Overall, performances were better in the control condition than in the ToM condition for 
both groups, raising the question of differences in task difficulty. To address this issue, two 
points need to be considered. First, ageing is known to affect ToM, such that healthy older people 
perform more poorly than younger ones on both attribution of intention and false-belief tests 
(Duval et al., 2011). This normal ageing effect on ToM abilities may therefore explain why the 
control group performed better in the control condition than in the ToM one. Second, in the 
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attribution of intention test, we used exactly the same format of stories and subsequent questions 
in all three conditions. Thus, the differences between them must have stemmed from the nature of 
the representations being manipulated. Consequently, task difficulty would seem to be an 
inadequate explanation for the impairment of cognitive ToM observed in SD patients. 
Dysfunction of ToM processes (inference and manipulation of intention and epistemic 
representations) is more likely to account for their  impaired performances. 
As regards the affective ToM test, we found that SD patients performed significantly 
more poorly than healthy controls on both basic and complex emotions recognition. Regarding 
the basic emotion condition, our results are consistent with numerous previous studies showing 
an emotional recognition processing disorder in SD via facial expression tests (Rosen et al., 
2002; 2004; Calabria et al., 2009). Moreover, authors have found that negative emotion 
recognition is particularly badly affected. Our results may have been influenced by an emotional 
valence bias, since only 30% of items illustrated positive emotions (e.g. happiness, surprise), 
compared with 70%, negative ones (e.g. sadness, fear, anger). Post hoc analyses revealed 
significant differences in the recognition of basic emotions according to valence in both groups 
(data not shown): in the SD patients, positive and negative emotions were recognized in 80% and 
45.90% of cases respectively, whereas these figures were 81.33% and 66.86% for the healthy 
controls. Consistent with the literature (Rosen et al., 2002; 2004), the only significant intergroup 
difference concerned negative emotions. This deficit of SD patients could be explained by brain 
abnormalities other than their anterior temporal ones. Numerous studies in healthy and 
neurological populations have pointed to the crucial involvement of the amygdala, insula, 
fusiform gyrus or superior temporal gyrus in the recognition of emotion, including negative 
emotion (Anderson et al., 2000; Rosen et al., 2002; Omar et al., in press; for a review, see 
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Adolphs, 2002). The considerable atrophy and hypometabolism of these brain regions in our SD 
patients may thus have impaired their basic negative emotion processing. 
Concerning complex emotions, we also found significant differences between our SD 
patients and controls, and these differences might have been even greater had it not been for the 
floor-level scores obtained by the control group for several emotions (data not shown). This result 
is not surprising, given that previous studies have reported the involvement of the temporal poles 
in complex emotion processing in the healthy population (Burnett and Blackmore, 2009). 
Although numerous studies support the notion that complex (or social) emotion processing is 
sustained by a more extensive brain network than that of basic emotions, temporal regions 
represent key processing sites (Britton et al., 2006; Castelli et al., 2010; Takahasi et al., 2008). 
Researchers have also demonstrated that complex emotions are processed in the amygdala 
(Adolphs et al., 2002). In the latter study, authors found that patients with unilateral or bilateral 
amygdala damage failed to recognize social emotions in the Eyes test. Hence, the atrophy and 
hypometabolism in the temporal pole and amygdala in our SD patient group may explain their 
failure to infer complex emotions. 
Likewise, in the composite ToM task, the SD patient group performed poorly in both the 
experimental and control conditions. Given that the control condition checked the inferences they 
made from the characters‟ pictures alone (i.e. without any context or response pictures), their 
failure in the experimental condition must therefore have been related to their inability to deduce 
the character‟s preference. The detailed analyses of responses in the ToM condition confirmed 
their tendency to choose more context-related responses (i.e. without taking the character‟s 
preference into account) than the controls did. Interestingly, the SD patients were more likely 
than the controls to justify their choices on the basis of their own preferences or other unexpected 
criteria. This fits in with previous behavioural studies in SD patients reporting their self-
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centredness and egocentric world view (Snowden et al., 2001). SD patients often present 
abnormal egocentric behaviour, referred to as “behavioural egocentrism” by Belliard et al. 
(2007). Whereas its origin is still unknown, this disorder seems to be specific to SD (compared 
with bv-FTD) and could be partially related to ToM impairment (Bon et al., 2009). A future 
study could be conducted to understand this pattern of results by exploring relations between 
ToM‟s taste scores and behavioural egocentrism measures. In any event, our participants‟ 
performance on the composite ToM task clearly indicates that SD patients have difficulty 
understanding other people‟s cognitive and affective mental states when these are embedded. 
Considering the contextual responses and personal justifications made by SD patients in the test, 
we suggest that they mainly rely on contextual knowledge and their own personal interests when 
dealing with social interactions. Because our test was designed to explore ToM under conditions 
that corresponded to the daily social context, it inherently encompassed both affective and 
cognitive ToM, thus preventing us from distinguishing between the two. We therefore cannot 
conclude whether the deficit we observed resulted from a cognitive impairment (inferring 
thought), affective impairment (inferring preference) or both. Future research is needed to 
unravel this issue. 
Finally, our subjective cognitive and affective ToM subscale findings suggest that the SD 
patients were aware of their affective ToM disturbance but not of their difficulty in inferring and 
understanding the intentions and beliefs of others. In addition, despite massive semantic memory 
disturbance and episodic memory failures, SD patients did not complain more than controls about 
their daily memory functioning, as attested by their responses to the Cognitive Difficulties Scale. 
Taken together, these results suggest an impairment of cognitive functioning awareness in our SD 
patients. Anosognosia has been widely reported in frontotemporal lobar degeneration (Eslinger et 
al., 2005; O‟Keeffee et al., 2007): patients tend to underestimate the extent of their cognitive and 
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behavioural changes, even if metacognition deficits are more severe in bv-FTD than in SD 
patients and affect a broader range of cognitive domains (Eslinger et al., 2005; Zamboni et al., 
2010). Anosognosia for behavioural disability has been associated with right temporal atrophy in 
patients with FTD or corticobasal syndrome (Zamboni et al., 2010) and with left temporal pole 
hypometabolism in patients with bv-FTD (Ruby et al., 2007). The atrophy and hypometabolism 
of these structures in our own SD patients may have contributed to their lack of awareness of 
cognitive ToM deficits. We observed a significant correlation between the cognitive ToM 
subscale and literal fluency performance in the SD patients. Because the literal fluency task 
involved strategic processes, it is tempting to conclude that this result reflects the involvement of 
executive functions in making such self-assessments. However, in SD, literal fluency 
performance is determined mainly by semantic memory capacity and left temporal cortex 
metabolism (Laisney et al., 2009). Accordingly, in SD, fluency performances can be regarded as 
an index of disease severity and we can assume that patients become increasingly unaware of 
their cognitive ToM difficulties as the disease progresses. 
The SD patients‟ awareness of their affective ToM disturbance is more surprising. In a 
previous study, Eslinger et al. (2005) found that SD patients overestimated their affective ToM 
ability on a cognitive empathic subscale. These discrepant results may stem from the way in 
which metacognition was assessed, for while Eslinger and colleagues (2005) compared reports of 
patients and their relatives, we compared the SD patients‟ subjective assessments with those of 
the healthy controls. Thus, our study revealed a dichotomy between cognitive and affective ToM 
insight in SD patients. Given the impact of ToM deficits, especially affective ToM deficits, on 
family and social interactions, the patients‟ relatives may well have attempted to force the 
patients to consider their affective difficulties, thus facilitating their awareness. Other studies 
need to be conducted in order to understand this pattern of results more fully. 
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Overall, this study provides evidence of an objective impact of SD on cognitive and 
affective ToM. While the patients‟ semantic impairment may have contributed to their poor ToM 
performances, it is unlikely to provide the full explanation. The patients in our study were still in 
the mild stage of the disease and we used procedures designed to minimize the confounding 
effect of the patients‟ semantic impairment on their ToM performance. It is interesting to note 
that the correlation analysis between the semantic memory scores and the ToM performances 
revealed only one significant correlation (between the Concept subscale of the Mattis scale and 
the second-order condition of the false-belief task). The SD patients‟ inference ability was 
impaired for intentions, beliefs and affective states. The cognitive ToM deficits in SD patients 
would appear to be associated with the cerebral atrophy in the left temporal lobe and 
hypometabolism in the temporal lobes and medial frontal cortex. Impairment of the affective 
ToM would seem to be the result of abnormalities in the temporal regions and amygdala. Finally, 
the subjective assessment of ToM suggests a dichotomy between cognitive and affective aspects 
with anosognosia only for cognitive ToM disabilities in the early to moderate stages of the 
disease. SD patients hence differ from bv-FTD patients, who present deficits on all objective 
ToM tasks (Gregory et al., 2002) and severe anosognosia. SD patients were shown here to 
display deficits in intersubjectivity due to a cognitive and affective ToM impairment. We 
therefore suggest that it is this difficulty in attributing mental states to others that leads SD 
patients to become focused on themselves, which would explain their self-centred responses to 
the composite ToM task and/or their general behavioural egocentrism described in literature. In 
turn, behavioural egocentrism may also influence ToM abilities and interpersonal relationships. 
However, our results must be viewed with caution, given the heterogeneous patterns of ToM 
deficits displayed by the patients, as well as the use of a unique task of affective ToM. They now 
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need to be confirmed and reinforced in further experiments exploring the link with their 
behavioural egocentrism in greater detail. 
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Table 1 
General data about the SD patients and healthy controls groups 
 
 SD patients (N=15) Healthy controls (N=36) 
Gender (Male/Female) 6/9 12/24 
Age (years) 64.27 ± 6.53 64.14 ± 8.25 
Education (years) 11.02 ± 4.07 11.69 ± 3.91 
sCDS 
a
 24.15 ± 9.41 19.81 ± 9.99 
sGDS 
b
 1.15 ± 1.34 0.72 ± 0.74 
Mattis 
c
 118 ± 9.57 139.05 ± 4.38 
Illness duration (years) 3.93 ± 1.98 _ 
 
 
a 
short Cognitive Difficulties Scale, administered to 13 SD patients. The cut-off 
score is 30. 
b
 short Geriatric Depression Scale, administered to 13 SD patients. The cut-off 
score is 2. 
c 
Mattis Dementia Rating Scale, administered to 12 SD patients and solely to 
participants over 65 years. The cut-off score is 130. 
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Table 2 
Neuropsychological data of the SD patient group  
Cognitive tests  n  m ± s µ z-score % impaired SD 
Memory functions 
Semantic memory 
Fluency task 
- Literal (letter “P”) 12 12.33  (± 4.44) -1.8  (± 0.71) 66.67 
- Categorical (animals) 12 9.25  (± 3.08) -2.86  (± 0.35) 100 
Picture naming (%) 15 39.97  (± 25.06) -15.64  (± 7.53) 100 
Concept (Mattis) (/39) 15 32.4  (± 3.07)  - 33.33 
  
Episodic memory 
Logical memory 
- Immediate recall (/75) 10 22.2  (± 10.32) -1.8  (± 1.23) 50 
- Delayed recall (/50) 10 12.5  (± 7.44) -1.66  (± 1.12) 40 
- Recognition (/50) 10 16.5  (± 7.92) -2.21 (± 2.21) 30 
Test de la Ruche 
- Immediate recall (/10) 11 9.09  (± 2.21) 0.29  (± 1.22) 9.09 
- Delayed recall (/10) 10 9.2  (± 1.62) 0.66  (± 0.7) 0 
- Recognition (/10) 10 10  - 0.55 (± 0.22) 0 
Rey-Osterrieth complex figure  
- Delayed recall (/36) 13 14.54  (± 8.31) -0.64  (± 1.53) 15.38 
Working memory 
Forward digit span 15 5.8  (± 1.32) 0.12  (± 1.23) 0 
Backward digit span 15 4.2  (± 1.47) 0.22  (± 1.43) 13.33 
Executive functions
 
Attention 
Trail-Making Test A (s) 15 52.93  (± 14.05) 0.69  (± 1.00) 20 
Errors  0.07  (± 0.26)  - 6.67 
Shifting  
Trail-Making Test B (s) 14 110.29  (± 33.23) 0.04  (± 0.58) 6.67 
Errors  0.33  (± 0.82)  - 13.33 
Trail-Making Test B-A (s) 14 59.36  (± 30.74) -0.11  (± 0.61) 6.67 
Updating  
Running span (/16) 11 5.27  (± 3.72) -0.98  (± 1.19) 27.27 
Inhibition 
Colour Stroop Test (interference in s) 14 162.57  (± 54.08) 0.75  (± 1.13) 21.43 
Nonverbal reasoning 
Raven‟s coloured progressive matrices (/36) 12 32.25  (± 4.39) 0.74  (± 0.93) 0 
Instrumental functions 
Praxis 
Copy of Rey-Osterrieth complex figure (/36) 15  34.87  (± 1.96) 0.19  (± 0.81) 0 
  
n = number of SD patients for the task considered 
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Table 3 
Comparison between SD patients and healthy controls on ToM abilities  
ToM Tests and measures (%) SD patients Healthy controls z p  
Objective assessment  
Cognitive ToM 
Attribution of intention task
1
  
ToM condition 72.86 (±23.35) 93.38 (±9.36) 3.63 <.001 
Character control condition 88.49 (±17.03) 94.49 (±8.90) 0.95 ns 
Object control condition 94.29 (±16.51) 97.31 (±5.74) -0.40 ns 
False beliefs (total ToM score) 66.66 (±18.86) 85.73 (±13.44) 3.51 <.001 
1st-order ToM condition 73.33 (±21.06) 90.58 (±12. 26) 3.16 .002 
2
nd
-order ToM condition 58.69 (±19.73) 80.56 (±20.82) 3.16 .002 
Control condition 96.44 (±8.31) 95.03 (±6.98) -1.36 ns 
Affective ToM 
Face/eyes test     
basic emotions 55.33 (±14.07) 71.94 (±14.11) 3.52 <.001 
complex emotions 44.15 (±18.24) 55 (±17.48) 1.99 .05 
Composite ToM 
2
 
Tom‟s taste    
Experimental condition 63.64 (±13.81) 87.50 (±14.56) 3.81 <.001 
Control-like condition 65 (±14.49) 97.06 (±11.01) 4.25 <.001 
  
Subjective assessment 
ToM scale (total score)
 3
 39.70 (±10.59) 57.50 (±12.81) 3.17 .002 
Cognitive ToM subscale 38.43 (±18.89) 52.41 (±20.67) 1.65 ns 
Affective ToM subscale 46.39 (±12.26) 62.59 (±12.48) 3.45 <.001 
Note. 
1
Analyses were conducted on 14 SD patients; 
c
Analyses were conducted on 10 SD patients; 
3
Analyses were conducted on 12 SD patients. Otherwise, analyses were conducted on 15 SD patients. 
Significant comparisons after false discovery rate corrections are in bold. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison between SD patients ToM insight and normal standard 
 
 Z-score mean Reference value t p 
Cognitive ToM insight measure -0.96 0.00 -2.28 .04 
Affective ToM insight measure 0.77 0.00 1.76 ns 
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Figure legends 
 
Fig 1 Clusters of significant (p<0.01 family-wise error corrected) atrophy (A), and 
hypometabolism (B), in patients with SD compared to controls, as superimposed onto coronal 
slices of the Montreal National Institute template. 
 
Fig 2. Example of story (first order) used in the false belief task. 
 
Fig 3A. Choices of responses on the Tom‟s taste. 
CR: correct response; C-P: response taking the context into account but not Tom‟s preference; 
PC: response taking Tom‟s preference into account but not the context; UR: unsuitable response 
 
Fig 3B. Justifications of responses on the Tom‟s taste. 
P: justified according to Tom‟s preference; C: justified according to the context; Self: justified 
according to participant‟s own preference in the context; Other: any other justifications. 
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